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The Peace Testimony: Does C’hristian
Commitment Make a Dii7ere;:ce?
T. VAIL PALMER, JR
The relationship of Christian cot ntnlent to social concern
has been, and is, a problem. Lovers of men and planners of so
cial change have argued long with one another: Is Christianity
an opiate of the people, a hindrance to progress? Does Christi
anity give the only sure foundation to the coiscern for human
dignity? Or is social action something in which all men of good
will — Christian and Jew, theist and humanist — can unite, be
cause their religion or lack of it makes little difference in the
area of social concern?
The arguments have been going oti in the Christian Church,
too. Roman Catholics developed a doctrine of natural law: there
are natural virtues such as courage, temperance, wisdom, and
justice, on which all rational beings can unite and build a good
society; what Christians add are the supernatural virtues of faith,
hope, and charity. Luther was convinced that this view con
fused and confounded nature and grace; the Christian should
bear his cross in humble Christian love in private life, but hi
social and political life should be guided by Romans 13: “the
powers that be are ordained of God,” and bear the sword “to
execute wrath upon him that doeth evil”; therefore the Chris
tian as citizen or as ruler, in the order of creation, must act in
ways that are forbidden to him as an individual and churchman
in the order of redemption. The Anabaptists accepted Lutl’er’s
views on Romans 13 and the orders of creation and redemption,
but revcrsed his conclusions: Christians live in the order of re
demption and are guided by the ethics of nol-resisting love:
therefore they cannot take any part in the order of creation, in
the tasks of government and social change. Calvin would have
nothing to do with this separation of Church and society, nor
with the Catholic ethics based on human reason: scripture, as
9
God’s revelation, is an unbroken unity; the moral
law in both
Old and New Testaments, summed up in the Ten
Command
ments, is a sufficient guide for Christian conduct in
individual
life and in society.
DLVFLO1’MEl THROUGH OLAKER HISTORY
Early Friends made their own distinctive contribution
to
the problem of Christian commitment and social
concern. They
refused to reduce Christian ethics in society to the
demands of
an order of creation or to the natural virtues of
rational man or
even to the Ten Commandme1t5. They
proclaimed that the
spirit of Christ called them to absolute perfection,
in harmony
with the scriptural commands of suffering,
non-resisting love.
But they continued to see participation in social
and even
overnrnefltal action as a live option in certain
circumstances.
George Fox encouraged Friends in Barbadoes to
serve as con
stables and to “double your diligence in your
offices, in doing
hat which is just, true, and righteous”; William Penn felt cal
led to undertake a “holy experiment” in
goveri1me1t “that an
example may be set up to the nations.”2
The origin and history of the Quaker position can be seen
ltrticularly clearly in the case of the
peace testimony. The clas
sical statement of the early Quaker peace testimony is the
so-
called Declciatiofl of 1660, in which Friends proclaimed:
We do certainly know, and so testify to the world,
that the spiril of Christ, which leads us into all
Truth, will never move us to fight and war against
Viny man with outward weapons, neither for the
kingdom of Christ, nor for the kingdoms of this
world.3
In this remarkable document Friends
demonstrated their con
victions about the guidance of the spirit by
extensive argument
from scripture. They were, indeed, trying to
explain why they
ou1d not participate in rebellion, not international
war. In
light of this historical situation, it is especially
notewortilyat
they did not quote RomanS 13, the classical
Christian text a
gainst rebellion! The saute Christian commandmcnts
applied
both to action “for the kingdom of Christ” and to
action “for
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ftIcii ni the relevant material for a JusLory of the peace
testimony as a way of relating Christian commitment to Social
concerji can be found in Robert. Byrd’s Quaker Ways in Foreign
Policy. Robert Byrd shows hos’ the earliest Friends, with revo
lutionarv ieal, denounced and lenounced war as sin and the
consequence of sin, and tried to convert even the ruling heads
of government, at home and abroad, to their own faith and pra.
dcc. The0 came the Quietist reaction, with an eventual total
withdi aw iii from publ:c responsibility in order to maintain the
purity Of tb Qilaker witness. Finally has conic a gradual emerg
ence from the Quietist shell, with a corresponding- increase in
concern for anti sense of responsibility; toward the specific course
of events in international relations. In Robert Byrd’s own words,
the chief historic trends in the Friends peace testimony have
been as follows:
First, l’rtend’ primary interest has been iii time
oiidcilying causes and forces at work in interna
inual affairs Initially the c:ause was seen to he
a sininle lack of Christianity, Friends’ remedy then
being to remind those in authority of their Chris
tian resnonsibilities A dimmer view of time possi
bilit of a more Christiai attitude in public policy
then set in and the remedy was to withdraw from
actis e particination in public affairs in order to
main ia i, in the life of the Society of Friends at
least, a hastio which the forces of evil could not
penetrate and from which, in God’s good time,
Christian principles might go forth to control tile
world’s affairs. Finally, there has been a gradual
returim to an emphasis on the immediate applica
biIit of Christian principles to public poli y.These principles Coijie to be seen, however as no
monopoly of Christianity’ and as plincif)les which
are expressed not only in the lives of indiviclimis
but also in the working out of social and economic
problems on the political plane.
Se oiidlv, as Friends have faced thc social, eco
ucimic. and political problems inherent in “Chris
tianizing” [omeign policy, hey has e been draw-n
steadily closer to involvement at the centres of the(lecision-nmaking process Friends too began to
put these policies Into effect themselves in such
mattel-s as improving the channels of international
liegotiat ion and communication, in recoHstruction
and relief work, and, ultimately, by serving as the
agents of Public policy at points where such poli
cies have been in accord with what Friends under
stand their religious insights to reqUire of them.4
There are points at which Robert Byrd’s helpful analysis of
these historical trends falls short; and these are crucial points
for any study of the problems involved in the relationship be
tween Christian commitment and Quaker social concern. He
tends to overemphasize the singleness of the direction taken by
Quaker concerns for peace, since the Quietist period, by empha
sizing only one side of contemporary developments. He writes,
for instance:
s the policies Friends have advocated for years
have come closer to the threshold of political real
ity, questions of tactics and implementation tend
to replace discussions on the level of broad objec
tives. . . . There is some evidence that Friends have
been willing, at times, to appeal in terms that are
most apt to gain results rather than in terms which
will accurately reflect their own reasons for favour
ing or opposing the particular policy at issue.5
But he fails to l3reseit the evidence that there has been a strong
trend, as well, in a divergent direction, a trend which is less in
clined to modulate the more radical implications of pacifist ethics
in order to gain immediate results. In terms of a frequently-
stated analysis, there are in the Society of Friends today both
‘prophets’ and ‘reconcilers’, and the differences between the two
have created, on occasion, serious difficulties for the Society in
its attempts to express and apply the peace testimony.
Robert Byrd also fails to take account of the implications
of some fundamental shifts in the nature of Quaker religious ex
perience antI belief. Early Quakers proclaimed a radical and
prophetic Christian faith, and attempted to spread it with icr-
sent missionary zeal; their peace testimony was a corollary of this
Christian faith and experience. The contemporary American
Friends most deeply concerned for the peace testimony gener
ally tend either to be frankly non-Christian in their theology or
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more unu ersal than the Christian faith, and that Christian
missionary activity is consequently either undesirable or Com
pletely separable from peace education and action. To recognize
the cliscontmuity of this position with that of earl’ Quakerisnt
is to raise a weighty question al)OUt Robert Byrd’s asslimptiol:
that the contemporary trend is essentially a ‘‘return” to the
original Quaker emphasis.
I’RO!’I-IFJ VS. RECONCtISER IODAV
Let us turn Our attention first to the tension between the
‘prophet’ and the ‘reconciler’ in the Society of Friends today.
The ‘reconciler’ is, briefly, the Friend who sees his most urgent
task to be that of bringing together the opposing sides in any in
ternational dispute. He feels that negotiation, conciliation, and
ierstiasion are the most hopeful ways of solving conflicts short of
war, and that Iris primary task is to help bring the policy-makers
of rival states to mutual understanding. He tries not to intrude
his own point of view, about the rights and wrongs on any par
ticular question, into the conciliation process. At his most char
acteristic, he is likely to be found in a Quaker team at the U. N.
or on a trip to Moscow or Peking, or serving as a Quaker ‘pres
ence’ in some international ‘hot spot’ such as Berlin or the Gaza
strip or as clean of a seminar for younger diplomats or parlia
men tarians who may some day be key decision-makers in their
respective countries. The ‘prophet’, on the other hand, is the
Friend who sees his most urgent task to be that of demonstrating
the immorality and suicidal nature of the dependence on armed
force as a keystone of national policy. He feels that non-violent
direct action is the most hopeful way of solving conflicts short of
war, and that his primary task is to show, by dramatic action,
the nature and effectiveness of the non-violent alternative to
armed defense. He zealously attempts to make his own point ot
view as widely and as thoroughly known as possible. At his most
characteristic, he is likely to be found in a protest ship sailing
into Leningrad harboi- or the Johnston Island bomb-test zone,
or leading a peace march, or cranking out a mimeographed set
of procedures for organizing volunteers in a many-sided peace
action campaign in a large metropolitan area.
There is a Contemporary Quaker mythology that being
6
either a ‘prophet’ or- a reConCilerb is simply a
matter of temper
ament, that the two types compleme1t each other
in the carry
ing out of the peace concerns of the Society of
Friends, that both
are needed, and that ‘prophet’ and ‘reconciler’
should recognize
their need for each other and hence desist from
their sometimes
unprophetic and nonreCOnciling criticisms of each
other’s ap
proach. The dilficult) with this appeal is that the dilierCWe
is
not situpi one of teinperanlent. Fundamental
differences in
philosophy in social analysis are involved in these
positions,
and it is not possible for either to carry out his job effectively
and consistently without to some extent getting in
the way of
what the other is trying to achieve. The consideration
of these
shift our terminology and, describe the ‘reconciler’
as a ‘liberal
differences in philosophy and social analysis will he helped
if we
pacifist’ and the ‘prophet’ as a ‘ra(liCal pacifist’.
The difference between the liberal pacifist and
radical paci
fist positions can be typically seen in the series of
studies on
questions of international relations prepared between
1949 and
1935 by working parties for the American Friends
Service Com
mittee. The first three of these, The United States and
the Soviet
Union, Steps to Peace, and Toward Security Throngh
Disarina
‘,,ent, are good statements of a liberal pacifist approach
to cur
rent international problems. ‘The final study, Speak
Tnt/h to
Powel, is a persuasive if perhaps slightly muted, exposition
of
the radical pacifist position. The first three emphasize
such pro
nosals as negotiating for world-wide disarmament,
submitting
disputes among the major powers to mediation and conciliation,
improving the atmosphere in the United Nations. Speak
Truth
to Power puts its emphasis on proposing non-violent
national
policy as an alternative to dependence on armed violence
for
national defense; it suggests that, in order to achies e
disarma
merit, “in the last analysis a pacifist policy would
require uni
lateral action if agreement could not be achieved.”7
Negotia
tion and non-violence, respectively, are seen as requiring
certain
Codiditions for their full and effective exercise. The
following
principles of negotiation are suggested:
There is no cOntrCveeSy which cannot be negoti
ated. . . . The test of successful negotiation is a
7I 3
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ut >rkablc agreenient[, n]ot the individual nations
gain in advantage. . Negotiation requires a flex
ible attitude
... an open mind . . persistence
recognizing that opposite interests mar he gen it
inelv and deeply felt )1-ivacy.’
Non-violence, including- non-cooperation and good ivill for its
effective action, has, on the other hand, its own prerequisites:
“it demands greater discipline, niore arduous training, and
more corn-age than” military violence.
There is sonic suggestion in these sI;uclies of the social con
text within which the pronosals for negotiations or non-violence
would be relevant. Negotiation is suggested in terms of the ul
timate objecti Cs of the American people: “In the United States
we have accepted the principle that men can resolve their dif
ferences by means of free discussion, understanding, honourable
compromise, and the use of recognized procedures of govern
ment for reaching decisions.”° Non-violence, on the other hand,
could become national policy by first being the program of a
committed and growing pacifist minority; this approach is rec
otumenclect as belonging to the nature of the democratic process:
“The presence of vigorous, pioneering minorities has been gen
erally recognized as essential to a healthy democracy.”11 The
AFSC studies do not probe much further into the social analy
sis on which they base their proposals. We need to examine the
writings of individuals, if we are to gain a better grasp of the
assumptions behind the proposals of liberal and radical pacifism.
THE LIIlER-L P\CtFIS1: TETE RECONCILER
The liberal pacifist, as we have seen, tends to recommend
such remedies for international conflict as mediation, concilia
tion, negotiation. Such processes require, as Jack Powelson
indicates, an increase in mutual understanding: “It is in a
greater understanding- of the minds of other men and a greater
faith in human ability to labor through the obstacles of disagree
ment . .
. that our hopes for peace must be founded.’’’ The paci
fist should work for a more mature diplomacy, “with foreign
ministers who can see beyond the thought framework of their
own environment and understand the thinking process that has
led others of diflerent background to approach the problem in
S
a different manlier.”3 The emphasis is on the understanding
and the action of the diplomat as an individual, in direct per
sonal contact with his opp site number. The goal is seen by
1-larrop anti Ruth Freeman as world community; and those na
tions which want community do “want, and must get, partici
pation in negotiating. The price of community is IitgUe.”
The essential ingredient for improving international relations,
to the liberal paciSt, is dialogue, conversation; and conversation
is a relationship between individual persons.
But most liberal pacifists also work actively for a strength’
ened United Nations, for world law or world government. Rob
ert Byrd claims that “Friends have felt riot only that the inter
national or world community requires organizational form, but
also that this organization must be based on law.” Similarly,
Samuel Levering insists that “the machinery of peace is law,
courts and enforcement”t’at the international level.
I)oes this concern for ‘building the institutions of peace’
counteract the liberal pacifist emphasis on personal ielation
ships in settling conflicts? Samuel Levering considers police ac
tion to be limited, in its sphere of application, to individuals
cather than to social groups: “Police arrest individual violators
to protect the community. .. . Nor do police fight against a
whole commuflity.” Ro-bert Byrd sees the Quaker enrpliasis
as having been on such aspects of international law as “the prim
ciple of universal accountability of individuals before interna
tional law,” that is, on those aspects of law involving relation
ships with individuals.
The liberal pacifist understanding of the nature and role
of gmermlment in controlling international conflict is spelled out
especially clearly b) Kenneth Boulcling. He defines the most
important activity of government as conflict control. In this con-
text, “One of the great organizational problems of mankind.
is the control of violence, or more generally the control of con
} Ilict to the point where procedural institutpS are adequate to
handle it.”’ By procedural institutions, Kenneth Boulcling
means the regularized processes through which conflict may be
resolved by “reconciliation,. . . comprornise .. . [or award,”°
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sa that, iu general, the liberal Pacifist sees governnient, includ
ing world gOverliflient to be a complex of processes favorable to
those conversations which are essential to conflict resoluto
su( It as negotiatioi and mediation. The Institutions of law and
government are the channels through which these interpersonal
Processes can take place more regularly, dependably and effect
i vely.
How does the liberal Pacifist expect to bring about the
changes in ]‘oreign policy which he advocates? Phillips Ruopp
suggesis that the process of social change is essentiall one of
conversaLion: “Adequate con1municatioi between private Citi
zens, and between citizens and their goverurne1t, constiultes the
public conversation which is so essential to the foreign Policy
of a democracy.”’ Robert Byrd similarly sees social change as
primarily coming about througl contacts between individuals:
he
gmuLluall) increasing awareness and practice of the
oneime5 ot mankind is held to be established most
firmly when it takes place in one individual, then
another and then still more individuals until a
new level of awareness becomes characteristic of
all.22
He does see that social groups can play a role in this process, but
it is essentially the role of giving specific form to this awareness
in individuals.
It is the iiittie of prii ate gi-oujs that they can be
gin to practice the future now, or as 500n as they
a’ e reads’, while Overrmienu based on popular
ccnsent roust be expected to follow’ only when the
trail has been well marked and charted to the pm-ox
imate satisfaction of the populatioj as a whole.23
The process of social change, then, is one of contagion, of giving-
personal demonstrations of a better way, and of educating indi
viduals until the greater part of the population has undergone
a personal change of attitude.
We are now ready to grasp the fundanientai thrust of the
liberal pacifist’s social analysis. He sees society, at every level,
as a texture of relationships between individuals, It is the mdi
s’iclual who forms the fundamental social the social group,
10
whether national state or local interest-group,
is primarily a
collection or aggregation of individuals. It e
ither has no sepa
rate reality of its own or attains such a separ
ate reality only
by exercising a totalitarian control which threa
tens the dignity
and lree(lom of the individuals making up the group. R
obert
Byrd takes time latter position when he states:
I lie junction ut governnent, for Friends, is thus
In ndamen rally spin tual. It is to aid in the spiritua
l
(leclopmei1( of individuals, to eliminate from So
ietv those things whi(:h pcrverh stunt, and retard
the spiritual growth of individuals, and to aid and
encourage its citizens to express and live according
to the most profound insights they can attain.’
Kenneth Boulding’s analysis, somewhat more so
phisticated, is
based on the concept oF a “party” or “behavior
unit’’25 as the
primary social agent. A behavior unit may be an
individual or
a group, but it has a clear boundary, and is conside
red as capa
Ne of discrete action, separable from that of any o
ilier unit; in
short, it acts like a pure individual. An organi
zation, further
moore, is composed of individuals, and its action is th
at of the
individuals who make it up, particularly the leader
s; he defines
an organization as “a structure of units that are called
roles, a
role being that part of a person’s behavior and poential
behav
ior that is relevant to the organization.”2 In actual
practice,
therefore, ‘‘The fundamental principle of behavior is m
uch the
same whether we are considering an individual acting o
n his
own behalf or a person acting in an organizational role
.”27 Ken
neth Boulding admits, furthermore, to an “economic
. . .
bias”’
in his approach to the theory of international and oth
er con
flict; his approach to economics is basically that of the
‘neo
classical’ successors to Adam Smith, an approach which sees t
he
cc-anouiic universe as an aggregate of individual firms, acti
ng in
essential independence of one another. Starting from su
ch as
su:options, it is possible to derive mathematical formulas
and
graphs describing in quantitative terms the effects of the inter
action of these units. He realizes that the use of such mod
els for
a general theory of conflict is an oversimplification, leavin
g out
many of the complex factors of social behavior, but he aff
irms,
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order of magnitude and do 1-lot affect the usefulness of the first-
order models.”29
The liberal pacifist analysis of the role of power in the social
structure can take more than one form. Robert Byrd rejects the
concept of ‘power. polItics’ as a fundamental factor in social an
alysis. The ultimate form of power in society is a moral power:
This i° operates from within, and in the de
gree to which the God-within is allowed to move
in harmony with the God-Spirit. This po’er iS
1 roug-h forth in human relations, including inter
national relations, when individuals are able to
reach through to that of God within themselves
and also to that of God in others; WI-len people are
able to ‘‘speak to that of God’ in others.3°
Kenneth Boulding does admit that social units exercise a fonn
of “competitive power”31 against each other, but this power is
(lescribed pi-imarily in quantitative units, comparable to the cost
of production of economic firms, and expressed primarily in
terms of the “loss-of-strength gradient,”3 which is analogous in
its function to the cost of transportation in economic price anal
ysis. The economic concept of ‘countervailing po’er’ and the
analogous ‘balance of power’ concept in political theory are
missing from Kennethl3oulding’s analysis, as from that of most
other liberal pacifists.
•- The fundamental weaknesses of liberal pacifism’s social
theory are its failure to take into account the corporate dimen
sion of hurnam society, the interdependent reality of social
gToups and of individuals in their acts and behavior, and its con
sequent lack of any serious grappling with the problem of power
as a primary factor in the interaction, at various levels, of social
groups. On these issues the radical pacifist has something more
substantial to say.
THE RADICAL L’AC[FJST: THE PROPHET
We have noted that the radical pacifist tends to recommend
non-violent alternatives to armed violence as national policy,
and to suggest that such alternatives be adopted unilaterally, if
necessai-y. A. J. i\fuste has stated this as dramatically as possible:
1’
a pacifist nation “would disarm unilaterally — at once — regard
tess of what other nations might be willing to do.”33 Radical
pacifist proposals for unil:uerai disarm oaiimen L are generally tied
n with a commnitment to organized non-violent action. Thus,
James Bristol insists, ‘‘Fle ultimate move would have to be a
Gandhian type of non-violent resistance to aggression and tyr
aflnv. Anyone whO advocates unilateral disarmament flow’ must
he prepared to take this last step.”34
More recently, radical pacifists have joined liberal pacifists
in proposing a program of unilateral initiatives for disarmament
and reduction of international tensions. Even here, a distinct
ively radical emphasis can he seen, as in Mulford Sibley’s state
ment: ‘Unilateral initiatives and eventually unilateral clisarnia
Tnent are ways of seeking a more effective defense ti-lan military
weapons can any longer provide.”35 In this statement we Can
note the emphasis on tile potential effectiveness of his proposals
that the radical pacifist is likely to make along with his insistence
on the immorality of war and violence. This emphasis on effect
iveness and power becomes even more marked when non-violent
resistance is presented as the alternative to armed force.
- Euhord Sibley, I-or instani e, writes, ‘‘Tue major purpose of a
scheme of organized nonviolent resistance would be to help
proitle power which would deter a would-be aggressor and to
frustrate the aggression should it actually take place.”6 A. J.
Muste suggests a deepening of the meaning of power in such a
context, when he states:
4 If Stamin and the Russian PeoPle were to be con
fronted with the truly revolutionary spectacle of a
Christian nation actually practicing the faith it
professed, taking the way of the Cross — of good
will, reconciliation and self-sacrifice —. . . I cannot
but believe they would be impressed. I think they
would know they were in the presence of power —
real power — j’’-ls’er against which neither Russia
nor the gates of hell could prevail.37
Does the radical pacifist differ from the liberal pacifist imm
the way he hopes to effect the changes in national policy which
he advocates? There does seem to be some similarity in general
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p:rc’iu o:ik a in;t iiiiitoiav h ((al .ncecl
of the necessity for iadic:al chan’e. But his minor—
ii can grow and, Since man3- of its members come
from cisc5 accustomed to articulating their views
liroug-h ptmhhc spea king and writ lug, the tendency
may be for the new attitude to suowball.”
Cecil Hinshaw aho emphasizes the importance of the process of
persuasion; he expects “a time of slow growth at first,” with the
eventual likelihood that “there comes a time when a kind of
bandwagon movement develops. This kind of result can be ex
pected, however, only if the logic and evidence of the cause is
pel’suasive.”9 Even in the context of these statements, however,
we can see a difference in emphasis. For Cecil HirisIaw, this
process of persuasion exemplifies the “power of the logic of pas
sive resistance.’’ 0 Mulforcl Sibley likewise emphasizes here “the
power of persuasion in [lie shaping- of public policy.”4’
The corollary of this recognition of the place of power in
changing public policy is that those who advocate non-violence
must organize themselves for effective action. Thus, according
to Cecil Hinshaw, one
resl)ous:b:liLy inunedli [ely resting upqn us is the
ornanization of those who share these coilvictirsas
into a working anti effective group. Both the win-
ii ing of the nation to this policy and the successful
operation of the progvamn theceafter requires [sic]
such organizational effectiveness.
This emphasis on om-g-anization can clearly be seen in the ap
proach of snch pce educators as Robert Pickus, who insist that
“involvjno” persons in active work for peace is one of the best
ways both of persuading them of the pacifist position anti of in
creasing the effectiveness of their commitment to it.
The eventual objective, within the nation, of this proce,s
of persuasion and organized action is that the proposed change
in national defense policy, as Cecil I-Iinshaw insists, “ultimately
o’-’h! be eaibocliecl in a political program,’’ which has as
its intentiomi “the victory (probably after initial defeats) of
such a political force at the polls.”
As might be expected, the radical pacifist’s fundamental
analysis of the nature of man in society is quite different from
14
that of the liberal pacifist. A. J. Muste, for instance, firmly
rejects the view “that human beings are thought o[ as self-
contained atoms never touching each other; it is an extremely
umclnidtialist ic. atomnistic: conception. The religious pacifist con
teptioll of man is, nit the contrary, a piofouncily social one.’’44
He further sees the need for attention to the distribution of
power and authority among social groups: “All organs of
human authority are limited. In any good society or democratic
order there will be all kinds of associations each with its au
thority and instruments for exercising it. Authority and power
will be diffused.”45
The radical pacifist denial of the theory of society as an ag
itregate of atom istic individuals does not imply a collectivism
in which the social group is the sole effective agent, swallowing
up the individual. There is a living tension bet
ween inclividu
alit3’ and corporateness at the core of radical pacifist thought.
Cecil Hinshaw’s analysis of one form of power in society ex
plains one aspect of this balance:
It is this cenien t of desire for social approval that
largely keeps society together at any time. This is
the real power that makes laws workable, that
makes a collection of people a society, a nation,
rather than atomistic individuals.46
The radical pacifist is hghly aware of the existence and
operation of power as a factor in the relations between persons
and groups at all levels. A. J. Muste affirms: “The mere fact of
existence means to influence, to impress oneself in various ways
upon another and to limit his possible choices.”47 A major
contribution of the radical pacifist to the analysis of the role of
power in society is his insistence that power exists in various
forms; it cannot be defined simply as the ability to coerce. Thus
Mulford Sibley “assumes the inevitability of power relations and
the centrality of pover for political society. But all pow’er is
not of the same nature. There are many types of io’.’ er.’ ‘Iwo
such types of pmver, operative in non-violent action, are sug
12-c-sted by Charles Walker: “Nonviolent direct action combines
th social power of noncooperation with the moral power of
voluntary suffel-ing for others.”’9 Mulford Sibley indicates the
151
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A THIRD TYPE OF APPROACHhr wee of the goal or objective of action in determining
the type of power that is brought into play:
(OlC ki fld ol. power is nOt appropriate or effica
cotis for all ohect’ves. Power in tcneral mar be
thought of as the ability to act or (10, the capacity
to accomplish chosen objecLLves. The kind o[
pover essential to act or do will depend in 1arte
c1e-ice on the nature of the objectives which one
is pursuin.5°
The radical pacifist, further, sees moral or spiritual power
as being potentially the most effective of all types of power.
This is the basis for his challenge to those theories of power
j)olitic.S which insist on the retention of armed force as the ulti
mate sanction in society. This approach is suinnii riett b
Bradford Lyttle:
Power operating in the affairs of men . . . is tile
ability to produce change or to resist change in
social institutions and in the intentions, wills, and
behavior of men. . . . The theory of power central
to nonviolent resnmuce is that the intentions and
wills of human beings can be changed by a posver
other tin’n fea Nonviolent power, spiritual
J)OlVCh, the poc to change the minds and hearts
of people ... is ttenerated b truthful action.’
It can he said that, while the radical pacifist is more pessi
mistic than the liberal pacifist about the likelihood of immedi
ate constructive social change in international relations, he is
more optimistic about the chances for fundamental changes in
the direction of society. The problem is that at both levels ex
perience tends to validate a more pessimistic view. Appeals to
governments to make flexible negotiations central have little
effect in practice; disarmament agreements are reached only
when they are in line with the canons of power politics, and are
likely to be scrapped when they no longer serve the natonal in
terest. On the other hand, the peace movement as such contin
ues to be a tiny and ineffectual minority in America, and the
experience of the unilateralist movement in England indicates
that there are factors which severely limit the extent, in actu
ality, of the ‘bandwagon’ or ‘snowball’ effect.
We need to note the further point that both liberal and
radical pacifism include in their numbers Friends who consider
theniseh es Christians and those who adhere to a more uuivecs
alist relig:ous pOsitiOO. It thus appears that neither liberal nor
radical pacifism is the simple consequence of a specifically Chris
tian position. If the classical Quaker insights are to be relevant
to the contemporary situation, then, we might seek to develop a
third type of social analysis which would suggest a more direct
relationship between Christian commitment and social concern
in the working out of the peace testimony. In particular, we
should note the rejection by the Declaration of 1660 of the tra
diuonal interpretation of Romans 13 as a basis for the Christian
attitude to the structure of society. It may be productie to
look into the implications of a contemporary analysis of Romans
13 which suggests a striking alternative to the traditional inter
pretation. This analysis is closely associated with the name of
Oscar Cullmann, whose contribution on this point is, in the
words of New Testament scholar G. H. C. Macgregor, “enor
mously suggestive and relevant.”2
In Romans 13:1, Paul urges Christians to be subject to ‘‘the
higher powers” (KjV) or “the governing authorities” (RSV)
The Greek word translated “powers” or “authorities’ is exousia;
it clearly refers in this context to the Roman imperial and pro
vincial government. The same word, however, when used in
the plural elsewhere in the New Testament, has a different
meaning, as can be seen in the following examples: Eph. 3:10 —
“the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places”; Eph. 6:12 —
“we are not contending against flesh and blood, but
against the
principalities, against the powers, against the world rulers of
this present darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness
in tile heavenly places”; Col. 1:16 — “in him all thngs were
created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether
thrones or dornin ions or principalities or authorities”; Col. 2:15
— “he disarmed the principalities and powers”; I Peter 3:22 —
“and is at the right hand of God, with angels, authorities, and
powers subject to him”; I Cor. 15:24 — “after destroying every
16 17
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rule and every authority and power.’’ It is generally accepted
that in these passages the term e.’s’ousioi refers to invisible, spir
itual authorities or powers, of angelic or demonic nature. Cull
mann goes a step further and argues that this meaning of the
word 0/Il is also present in Roman s 1 3. where the word re
fers simnltaneousv to earthly governments and to COSmic, Spil -
itual forces or beings. By pointing out the role of folk angel
in Jewish thought in tIme days of Jesus and Paul, he provides
backgiou:d for his claim that, for Paul, ‘‘the actual State author
it sJ’omh t of as the execuyi e agea t of angelic 1Jowers.’’
Clinton Morrison carries the algunlent further and shows that
not only Jewish thought but also that of the Graeco-Rornan
world in New Testament times assumed an intimate relationship
between invisible spiritual powers and governments on earth.
Morrison concludes:
There can be no proper unceistand ing of what
early Christians, Jews, arid their pagan uonteuipu
varies understood as the State, in particular as the
evoieciai, apart from that world view enveloping
nns and doino;ie,s. providence and powers, in
winch the ruler was 1)0th divine by appointment
and human by birth, and the boundaries between
the spirit world and the world of humanity and
nature were fluid and often imperceptible.
in short, as W. A. Visser ‘t Hooft points out,
Tie Biblical authors consider the state as the
organ of superhuman forces, forces which are in
themselves neither good nor bad, which may sers e
Pe plan of God hut which mar a!so, if they run
wild. mm against God.55
This interpretation shifts the emphasis away froni the
ti-aclitional view. That view has generally supposed that the
approval by Romans 13 of the governing authority as ‘‘God’
servant for your good” (Rom. 13:4) is opposed to and nmav eve:i
take precedence over the noints of view of Acts 5:29 — rWe must
obey God rather than men”
— and of Revelation 13, which sees
tile Roman empire as the beast from the sea to which Satan,
“the dragon gave his pOW and his throne and great author
ity,’’ (Rev. 13:2) and to which the Christian niay have to refuse
submission. But when we come to see, in the exoosiai of Romans
18
13, the same spiritual powers which have been disarmed b
God in the cruci6xion (Col. 2:15), are to be destroyed by Christ
at the end of the age (I Cor. 15:24) , and against which Chris
tians in tI/C meanwhile have to contend, usilig “the whole armor
of God’’ (Eph. 6:11-13) , then we can discern the potential temi
sic/n between Christians and the state even in Rornans 13.
Culhnann’s ConcluSion regarding the intplicatioiis of New
Testament thought for the Church’s task in this age is this:
First, it must loyally give the State everything nec
essary to its existence. It has to oppase anarchy
and all Zealotism within its own ranks. Second, it
has to fulfil the office of watchman over the State.
That means: it must remain h-i principle critical
toward every State and be ready to warn it against
transgression of its legitimate limits. Third, it
must deny to the State which exceeds its limits
whatever such a State demands that lies i’-thin the
i-o-ovince of reli2io-idleological excess; and in its
preaching. the Church must courageously describe
this excess as opposition to God.56
While claiming that the state is not necessarily called to be
Christian, Cullmann does not fully and directly answer the c1ues-
non whether there may be circumstances in which Christians
can at once remain obedient to the commands of Christ and take
direct responsibility for government. An unequivocal answer
to this question, indeed, cannot be drawn by direct inference
from the New Testament. The early Christians were not faced
with a social situation in which the direct application of their
Christian commitment to the institutional structul-es of society
was possible. A second problem posed for us by Cullmann is
what to make of the apparently ‘mythological’ New Testament
unuerstandmmg of the state; it is difficult for contemporary uau,
even as a Christian, to view the universe as one in which invis
ible porers — angels, clainmons, spiritual hosts — abound.
in order to answer dhc rst of these go timswe n cd o
view’ the New Testament in tile context of the wilole sweep oh
holy history.’ The Bible is primarily the account of th mighty
acts of God in history, through which 1-c wins his vi:tory over
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in the twentieth century has succeeded in strengthening its call
upon the religious loyalties of men. The international scene has
become the battleground for rival deities, as has been cogently
portrayed by so hard-boiled a realist as Hans Morgenthau:
The morality of the partict1ar group, far from
limiting the struggle for power on the international
scene, gives that struggle a ferociousness and inteti
sity not known to other ages. For the claim to uni
versalitv which inspires the moral code of ofle
particular group is inconipa tible with the identi
cal claim of another group; the world has room
for only one, and the other must yield or be de
snoyed. Thus, carrying their idols before them,
the nationalistic masses of our time meet in the in
ternational arena, each group convinced that it
executes the mandate of history, that it does for
humanity what it seems to do for itself, and that
it fulfills a sacred mission ordained by Providence,
however defined.57
But if the nations have thus become the true objects of wor
ship of millions — even of many who believe themselves to be
Christians — they effectually fill the functions ascribed to the
‘principalities and powers’ by Paul and his contemporaries.
The nation-state not only governs and restrains evil within its
bounds; it also attracts the nationalistic worship which makes it
such an infinite menace on the world scene. Spiritual power is
a reality — but not only for good.
THE PEACE TESTIMONY AND THE TRIUMPH OF GOD
What is the relationshp today of these great thrones and
authorities and powers to the sovereign God of history, whose
triumph over them on the scene of history is assured, through
the cross and resurrection, but not yet final and complete? The
Biblical, prophetic perspective on history suggests three possibil
ities. We may, indeed, be approacl’ing the apocalyptic end of
I] istory, in which Christ will appear in judgment on the mush—
room clotids. For such a contingency the Church’s task is one of
prayer and waiting, in faithful obedience. Or God may have
raised up the Communist powers fls vessels for his wrath upon
those peoples who call themselves after the name of Christ. For
22
Western Christendom has largely denied God’s commands to
execute justice, to recognize the dignity of all his children, to
turn aside from the way of the sword. The Communist nations
may thus be instruments of his discipline much as the Assyrians
and Chaldeans were upon the faithless people of Israel and u
dali. In light of this the Church’s task is like that of Jeremiah:
with aching heart to warn its fellow-countrymen to submit to
the chastisements of the Lord. Or it may be that God will bring
about the miracle that will save us from destruction or tyranny.
The Bible understands by miracle not a supernatural, inexplic
able happening, but a sign of God’s kingdom, a great and potent
act of God in raising up a prophet or a people unto himself froim
seemingly barren ground — an act with far-reaching, if unpre
dictable, historical consequences. We see such acts in the con
quest of Jericho, the return front the Babylonian captivity, the
Reformation, George Fox’s calling of the “great people to be
gathered.” The claim of the Christian faith is that the Church
is the chosen instrument for God’s mighty acts in the age of the
new covenant. If such an act is to come about in our day, those
who claim to be the Church are called to seek the radical re
newal of this Church, purging it of its archaism and its indiffer
ence to justice and its alliance with the princes of this age. The
call is to become a committed, revitalized people of God, knit
together in devotion to the Christ who is present to them in
comforting and awesome righteousness. Only such a people
would have a faith strong enough and deep enough to displace
loyalty to the nation, as the bearer of ultimate and universal
value, in the hearts of their neighbors, countrymen, and fellow-
humans over the whole earth.
Signs of the beginnitigs of such a renewal are not lacking
in our generation; the peculiar task of the Society of Friends, or
o- those in it who catch the vision of such a Church, is, first, to
relate ourselves closely to the forces of renewal that are already
present. Quakerism’s task is, secondly, to demonstrate in our
own lives and in rigorous Christian thought how indispensable
the peace testimony is for the Church, if the potential of these
forces for reHewal is to be realized, in this day when the Church
needs to die again “to the elemental spirits of the universe”
1
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(Col. 2:20) which are so visibly guiding the destinies of the
nations.
Specific practical steps, in which this task for Quakerism
can be made concrete, are likely to emerge if and as a group of
Friends becomes concerned to implement this approach. Only
a few tentative proposals can be suggested here. The program
of the Church Peace Mission, for instance, is a step in the right
direction in ternis of tackling the theological dimensions of this
task; this program needs to be made much stronger and more ex
tensive. Peace education conferences, ilistitutes, and study pro
grams could be given a new direction by centering them around
the study of basic Biblical theology. Public witness projects niight
be moved in the direction of some form of ‘prophetic symbol
ism.’ Above all, these programs need to emerge out ol’ the context
of corporate groups of Christians who are concerned for renewal
of the Church and of the world, and who have come together br
common study, seeking, prayer, and social and missionary action.
Such are the outlines of a ‘Christian pacifist’ position, which
aees society as the arena for the conflict of vast spiritual powers,
suggests commitment to a radical renewal of the Church as the
basis for social change, and places its hope at the international
lex el in taming or by-passing such deironic forces as rampant
nationalism through participation in Christ’s victory. This posi
tion has strong points of contrast with the liberal pacifist and
radical pacifist positions. The former sees society as an aggre
gate of individuals, suggests that social change comes primarily
through changing the lives anti outlooks of individuals, and puts
its hope al the international level in the development of per
sonal contacts antI understanding among individual leaders in
the nations. The latter sees society as a network of power-
structures, emphasizes the involvement of liOlTh in power-
exercising organizations for peace as the direction for social
change, and places its hope at the international level in the
exercise of spiritual power through organized non-violent action.
It is suggested here that such a ‘Christian pacifist’ position
may incorporate the best insights for today’s needs of the early
Quaker contribution to the question of the relationship between
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I will confine nmv comments on Vail Palmer’s helpful anti
provocative paper to three points: his discussion of social change,
his views on the liberal-radical dichotomy, and his delineation
of a “Christian pacifist” third force.
On the first, I find myself essentially in agreement with his
analysis of the liberal and radical pacifist views of social change,
and with his feeling that both are inadequate in certain respects.
The liberal view, with its emphasis on personal conversation
and the sensitizing of the individual spirit, makes an important
contribution in promoting accornodation in situations of ten
sion, because in a real sense it buys time, but I doubt its adequacy
in effecting the kind of revolutionary change needed in a world
whose values are largely bankrupt and whose capacity to destroy
is virtually infinite. It represents a holding action, not a formula
for basic change. The radical pacifist with his recognition of the
role of power, specifically spiritual power, and his, to me, mncuc
accurate description of the nature of society as reflecting a ten
sion between individuality anti corporateness, conies closer to
having the formula for radical social change. But he thinks to
produce it by organizing this power himself, and I think this is
where his theory falls down. The apocalyptic dimension is
needed. Sociologists speak of this as the unpredictable con
vergence of forces that suddenly opens the minds of men and
makes them ready for revolutionary change. Others, and I in
chide myself, call it the intervention of God in history.
( Vail Palmer, however, while he deplores the historic failure
r of the church “to respond creatively to the burgeoning vistas ofknowledge,” fails himself to do so when he calls for the renewal
and cleansing of the church as the key to needed change. That
is, he fails to relate the “great and potent act of God. . . with its
fat--reaching historical consequences” to any comprehensive the
ory of change which takes advantage of these new vistas. There
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